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Abstract: the paper discusses the failure of persuasion in the agones of Euripides, in 
spite of the fact that several characters in Euripides complain about the dangers of 
overpersuasive speech. In the plays of Euripides characters do change their minds, 
but not in the course of agones. ‘Anger’, ‘shame’, and ‘autonomy’ are three crucial 
factors in blocking the persuasive effects of persuasive language. Characters explain 
their change of minds not on the basis of persuasion but as a consequence of 
autonomous deliberation. The change of mind of Iphigenia in Iphigenia at Aulis is in 
keeping with the ethical development and self-definition of many characters in 
Euripides. 
 
In Euripides, characters often comment on the persuasive power of language. 
Hecuba notes that ‘persuasion’ is ‘the only sovereign of human beings’ (Hec. 816: 
πειθὼ δὲ τὴν τύραννον ἀνθρώποις µόνην). Rhetorical contests, formally 
designated as ‘contests of words’ (Eur. Andr. 234 and Pho. 930: ἀγῶν(α)... 
λόγων)1 are a frequent feature in his plays2.  
 Echoing sophistic rhetoric, one of the speakers in the fragmentary Antiope (fr. 
189) states that 
 
ἐκ παντὸς ἄν τις πράγµατος δισσῶν λόγων 
ἀγῶνα θεῖτ' ἄν, εἰ λέγειν εἴη σοφός.  
A man could make a contest between two arguments from any matter, if he were a 
clever speaker3.  
 
Protagoras famously claimed that he was able to do just that (DK 80 A 20, B6a), and 
we can still read an anonymous collection of such ‘double speeches’ from the late 
classical period (DK 90)4. Rhetoric is thus presented as indifferent to the moral 
value of the argument discussed, and in fact Euripides, in writing competing 
speeches for characters that fight each other, is doing on stage exactly what 
Protagoras claimed to be able to do in front of a crowd. Euripides’ plays, more 
dangerously, do this in a religiously sanctioned and politically crucial moment for 
the Athenian polis, the festival of Dionysus. These texts are doing precisely what 
                                                
1 For other ‘quasi-metatheatrical’ designations of agones cf. Mastronarde 2002 on Eur. Med. 546. 
2 Main discussions of agones: see Duchemin 1968, Strohm 1957 3-49, Collard 1975b, Buxton 1982, 
1-66 and 147-87, Conacher 1981, Lloyd 1992, Goldhill 1986 1-78 and 223-43, Goldhill 1997, 133-35 
and 145-50, Scodel 1999-2000, Dubischar 2001, Barker 2009, 324-65, Mastronarde 2010, 207-45, 
with further references. For a definition see Lloyd 1992, 1: ‘The agon basically consists of a pair of 
opposing set speeches of substantial, and about equal length. Other elements are often present, such 
as angry dialogue after the speeches, or a judgement speech by a third party, but the opposition of 
two set speeches is central to the form.’ 
3 Τranslation Collard and Cropp 2008. 
4 On the invention of rhetoric in classical Greece and its connection with drama see now Sansone 
2012.  
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Aristophanes’ characters accuse Euripides of doing: teaching morally bad people to 
speak well. It is not surprising that this type of language gets the enthusiastic 
approval of thieves and criminals, when ‘Euripides’ arrives in the underworld in 
Aristophanes’ Frogs (771-8).  
 In fact, characters in Euripides too complain about the fact that it is possible to 
speak well for immoral causes, as for instance Hecuba does in Hec. 1187-91: 
 
Ἀγάµεµνον, ἀνθρώποισιν οὐκ ἐχρῆν ποτε  
τῶν πραγµάτων τὴν γλῶσσαν ἰσχύειν πλέον·  
ἀλλ᾿ εἴτε χρήστ᾿ ἔδρασε, χρήστ᾿ ἔδει λέγειν,  
εἴτ᾿ αὖ πονηρὰ, τοὺς λόγους εἶναι σαθρούς,  1190 
καὶ µὴ δύνασθαι τἄδικ᾿ εὖ λέγειν ποτέ.  
Agamemnon, men’s tongues ought never to have more force than their doings: if a 
man has done good deeds, his speech ought to be good, if bad, then his words should 
ring false, and he should never be able to give injustice a fair name5. 
 
Plutarch repeats the accusations of Aristophanes, and finds Sophocles and Euripides 
guilty (Quomodo adul. 27f-28a):  
 
µάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν δεῖ ἐν ταῖς τραγωιδίαις ὅσαι λόγους ἔχουσι 
πιθανοὺς καὶ πανούργους ἐν πράξεσιν ἀδόξοις καὶ πονηραῖς. οὐ πάνυ γὰρ 
ἀληθὲς τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους λέγοντος 
 
 οὐκ ἔστ' ἀπ' ἔργων µὴ καλῶν ἔπη καλά· 
 
καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς εἴωθεν ἤθεσι φαύλοις καὶ ἀτόποις πράγµασι λόγους 
ἐπιγελῶντας καὶ φιλανθρώπους αἰτίας πορίζειν. καὶ ὁ σύσκηνος αὐτοῦ 
πάλιν ὁρᾷς ὅτι τήν τε Φαίδραν καὶ προσεγκαλοῦσαν τῶι Θησεῖ πεποίηκεν 
ὡς διὰ τὰς ἐκείνου παρανοµίας ἐρασθεῖσαν τοῦ Ἱππολύτου. τοιαύτην δὲ 
καὶ τῆι Ἑλένηι παρρησίαν κατὰ τῆς Ἑκάβης ἐν ταῖς Τρωιάσι δίδωσιν, 
οἰοµένηι δεῖν ἐκείνην κολάζεσθαι µᾶλλον ὅτι µοιχὸν αὐτῆς ἔτεκε. µηδὲν οὖν 
τούτων κοµψὸν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ πανοῦργον ὁ νέος ἐθιζέσθω, µηδὲ 
προσµειδιάτω ταῖς τοιαύταις εὑρησιλογίαις, ἀλλὰ βδελυττέσθω τοὺς 
λόγους µᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ἀκολασίας. 
27f It is particularly necessary to do this with tragedies in which plausible and artful 
words are framed to accompany disreputable and evil actions. For the statement of 
Sophocles [fr. 839 in Radt 1999] is not altogether true when he says: 
 
 From unfair deed fair word cannot proceed 
 
For, as a fact, Sophocles himself6 is wont to provide for mean characters and unnatural 
actions alluring words and humane reasons. And you observe also that his companion-
at-arms in the dramatic art [28a] has represented Phaedra as preferring the charge 
                                                
5 Τranslation Kovacs 1995. 
6 Babbitt 1927 apparently translates Emperius’ conjecture αὐτός, recorded in his apparatus, rather 
than the manuscript text οὗτος which he prints in the main text (reproduced above, except for this 
detail: I inserted Emperius’ conjecture in the main text). Hunter and Russell 2011 print Emperius’ 
conjecture, which they consider more rhetorically effective.  
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against Theseus that it was because of his derelictions that she fell in love with 
Hippolytus7. Of such sort, too, are the frank lines, aimed against Hecuba, which in the 
Trojan Women he gives to Helen, who there expresses here feeling that Hecuba ought 
rather to be the one to suffer punishment because she brought into the world the man 
who was the cause of Helen’s infidelity. Let the young man not form the habit of 
regarding any one of these things as witty and adroit, and let him not smile indulgently, 
either, at such displays of verbal ingenuity, but let him loathe the words of 
licentiousness even more that its deeds8. 
 
Plutarch unusually presents Sophocles as a writer who invents ‘alluring reasons‘ to 
justify the immoral actions of evil characters9: this can be viewed as a negative take 
on the ancient tradition that praised Sophocles’ ability in portraying characters10. 
Other sources present ‘a remarkably consistent and unanimous picture of Sophocles’ 
greatness’, stressing ‘his usefulness as a source of moral teaching’11. 
 Euripides, on the other hand, was often reproached for devising ‘immoral’ 
arguments for his evil characters12. This is especially evident in his agones, where 
many morally dubious characters speak eloquently; if they do manage to persuade, 
that would pose a great moral, social and aesthetic threat. Euripides’ characters 
themselves perceive, as Ruth Scodel notes, ‘the dangers of overpersuasive speech’13. 
Athenians were prone to political persuasion, and theatre was the cause of this love 
for persuasive speech, according to what ‘Cleon’ observed in a passage of 
Thucydides: when meeting in the Assembly, they act as ‘spectators of speeches’ 
(θεαταὶ ... τῶν λόγων 3.38.4) rather than as good deliberators, and are ‘the best at 
being deceived by a novel argument ... slaves to every new paradox’ (µετὰ 
καινότητος ... λόγου ἀπατᾶσθαι ἄριστοι ... δοῦλοι ὄντες τῶν αἰεὶ ἀτόπων 
3.38.5). In sum, Cleon concludes, they are ‘defeated by sweet talks, and similar to 
spectators of sophists’ (ἀκοῆς ἡδονῆι ἡσσώµενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς ἐοικότες 
3.38.7). Thucydides’ ‘Cleon’ compares the citizens in the assembly to spectators in 
the theatre, especially when he includes a clear allusion to Gorgia’s famous dictum 
on theatrical ‘deception’ (ἀπατᾶσθαι ἄριστοι)14. Unlike Simonides’ Thessalians, 
                                                
7 See Kannicht 2004, vol. I, 465, test. v. 
8 Τranslation Babbitt 1927, slightly adapted. On the interpretation of this passage see Hunter and 
Russell 2011 ad loc. 
9 For another instance where ancient readers ‘rectified’ the moral content of a passage by Sophocles 
cf. Soph. fr. 873 in Radt 1999, and Plut. Quomodo adul. 33d, with Hunter and Russell 2011 ad loc. 
10 Cf. Arist. Po. 1460b32 and D. H. De imit. 2 fr. VI II 11-13 in Usener and Radermacher 1929: 206 
(= Epitome of the treatise On imitation, chapters 11-13 in Aujac 1992: 34); these texts are reproduced 
as T 53a and T 120 in Radt 1999: 54 and 77. 
11 See Wright 2012: 598 and 597, respectively, with further references; T 108-147 in Radt 1999: 74-
82. 
12 Ancient readers showed limited sympathy for his ability in portraying all types of human ethical 
predicaments and views: see the texts cited above, note 10, and in general T 135, 145-154, 170-171 
in: Kannicht 2004, vol. I, 108-124. 
13 Scodel 1999-2000, 130. See Buxton 1982, 5 and Jouan 1984. 
14 See Gorgias 82 B 23 DK: Tragedy is ‘a deception [ἀπάτη] in which the person who effects the 
deception is more honorable [δικαιότερος] than the person who did not’ (translation Sansone 2012, 
91, with useful discussion and bibliography; see also Hunter and Russell 2011, 78 on Plut. Quomodo 
adul. 15d). Gorgias repeatedly stresses the persuasive power of speech: 82 B 11, Dow 2015, 14-19. 
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the Athenians are excellent in allowing persuasive speech to deceive them15. 
Theatrical and sophistic speech is thus presented as dangerously persuasive for 
Athenian audiences, which were exposed to conflicting views about political, 
military, and judicial action.  
 Can persuasion be effective at all? This topic is of course much debated in 
ancient and modern theories of rhetoric, politics, ethics, and business. Some scholars 
claim that persuasion in fact plays a limited role in influencing the choices of 
people, especially in political debates, where entrenched beliefs are unlikely to be 
changed by rational arguments.16 One should note that the lack of political parties 
made political choices in antiquity much less consistent and predictable than in 
modern democracies (and, possibly, more open to persuasion).17 Ancient and 
modern practitioners of rhetoric (and more modern practices, such as advertising, 
marketing, political propaganda) offer evidence supporting the claim that persuasion 
can be effective18. 
 But is persuasion effective in ancient tragedies? In most cases, it is not. Echoing 
earlier evaluations, Lloyd writes that ‘the agon in Euripides rarely achieves 
anything’19.  There are about twenty-one agones in Euripides20. In four cases only 
the course of the plot takes a turn as a consequence of what people say in the agon: 
the heralds in Heraclidae and Supplices are rejected; Helen and Menelaus persuade 
Theonoe (who perhaps does not need to be persuaded) in Helen; Heracles decides 
not to kill himself in the Heracles21. This lack of results is especially strange in 
tragedy, which is a genre full of action. Tragic characters often change their minds22, 
and manage to persuade each other: for instance, in Eur. Or. 1069-1100 Pylades 
persuades Orestes not to kill himself, and in Aesch. Ag. 905-74 Clytemnestra 
persuades Agamemnon to walk on the fragile and precious red fabric.  
 How come characters speaking in the agon fail to achieve their goal? Do they 
argue badly? Or is the text paradoxically suggesting that rhetoric is in fact devoid of 
power?  
 Many scholars have noted the similarities between the agon in Euripides and 
judicial and political oratory23: people are on trial for attempted rape (Hipp. 902-
1089) or murder (Hec. 1109-1292, El. 998-1138, Or. 470-728), and other debates 
discuss the legal, moral and military predicament of offering asylum to refugees 
(Her. 120-283; Suppl. 162-249 and 399-580). Scholars however have often also 
                                                
15 See Plut. Quomodo adul. 15c ‘when someone asked Simonides, ‘Why are the Thessalians the only 
ones whom you do not deceive (ἐξαπατᾶις)?’ he replied, ‘Because they are too backward to be 
deceived by me’ (trans. Sansone 2012, 99, with discussion and bibliography; see also Hunter and 
Russell 2011, 78 ad loc.). 
16 For a brief survey, and evidence to the contrary, see e.g. Tan, Niculae, Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil 
and Lee 2016 
17 Finley 1973 offers a classic treatment of this interpretive problem. 
18 On antiquity see Buxton 1982; Dow 2015; on modern practices see e.g. Perloff 2014. 
19 Lloyd 1992, 15. See Strohm 1957, 11: ‘Kein Streitgespräch schließt bei Euripides mit einer 
Einigung; in der Regel ist am Ende der Gegensatz gegenüber dem Anfang vertieft’. 
20 Lloyd 1992, 3 acknowledges only 13 agones, on the basis of a stricter criterion.  
21 Lloyd 1992 does not consider these scenes from Heracles and Helen as proper agones. 
22 See Knox 1966, Gibert 1995. 
23 See e.g. the discussion in Scodel 1999-2000. 
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noted some glaring differences from forensic practice: in many cases, the judge is 
one of the speakers24; in several other cases the decision has been taken in advance, 
and is merely confirmed in the trial (a ‘staged trial’ or ‘show trial’)25. In other 
debates no decision needs to be taken; characters simple try to assess who is to 
blame for the situation that is causing their suffering26. 
 It is true that some characters do change their minds after an agon. However, 
they do that for reasons that are completely different from the arguments advanced 
in the agon. For instance, in Hippolytus Theseus changes his mind because of divine 
intervention; in Andromache Hermione modifies her attitude in accordance to the 
change of circumstances. Theseus, after debating the fate of refugees with Adrastus 
in Eur. Suppl. 162-249, discusses the matter with his mother Aithra at 286-364, 
finally changing advice and accepting the supplication out of a sense of duty, and in 
accordance to what he sees as his ‘true’ character; he stresses that his previous 
words in the agon were morally and logically correct (333-5). Electra does change 
her mind, but only after killing her mother (El. 1182-1232). Heracles decides not to 
kill himself, but he does that in a reply to Theseus which starts with a complete 
rejection of Theseus’ arguments (HF 1340-52).  The case of IA 317-542 is especially 
complex: Menelaus changes his mind out of pity, not because he is persuaded by 
Agamemnon.  
 In the ‘trial’ type of agon, on the other hand, the decision is normally taken 
beforehand, or, if taken onstage, is not changed27. 
 Why then does Euripides devote so much space in so many dramas to 
inconclusive debates? Does the tragic text aim to show the powerlessness of 
language?  
                                                
24 See the following examples (the name of the ‘judge’ is listed after the names of the speakers): Eur. 
Hipp. 902-1089 (Theseus, Hippolytus: judge Theseus); Andr. 147-273 (Hermione, Andromache: 
judge Hermione); Andr. 547-746 (Peleus, Menelaus: judge Menelaus); Hec. 251-331 (Hecuba, 
Odysseus: judge Odysseus); Suppl. 162-249 (Adrastus, Theseus: judge Theseus); Suppl. 399-580 
(Theseus, Herald: judge Theseus); El. 998-1138 (Clytemnestra, Electra: judge Electra); HF 140-347 
(Amphitryon, Lycus: judge Lycus); HF 1255-392 (Heracles, Theseus: judge Heracles); IA 317-542 
(Menelaus, Agamemnon: judge Agamemnon). Note for instance that the ‘democratic’ decision in the 
Suppliant Women is taken by King Theseus, who is the only judge (as well as one of the speakers).  
25 The term ‘judge’ is used not only in reference to the role of formal judge in a judicial procedure, 
but also in reference to the person who has to make a decision on a practical matter or even simply 
express an ethical evaluation on the action past or future. See Eur. Her. 120-283 (Herald, Iolaus; 
judge Demophon); Hec. 1109-1292 (Polymestor, Hecuba; judge Agamemnon); Tro. 860-1059 
(Helen, Hecuba; judge Menelaus); Hel. 865-1090 (Helen, Menelaus; judge Theonoe); Phoen. 446-
635 (Polyneices, Eteocles; judge Jocasta); Or. 470-728 (Tyndareus, Orestes; judge Menelaus); IA 
1146-275 (Clytemnestra, Iphigenia; judge Agamemnon). The ‘democratic’ decision in Heraclidae is 
in fact taken by King Demophon, who is the only judge. In Hec. 1109-1292, Tro. 860-1059 and IA 
1146-1275 the decision has been taken in advance, and is merely confirmed in the debate. In Phoen. 
446-635 the ‘judge’ has no power; in Or. 470-728 Menelaus should express his evaluation on 
Orestes’ matricide, but abandons the scene and does not commit himself to help either Orestes nor 
Tyndareus; only in Her. 120-283 and Hel. 865-1090 a ‘decision’ takes place on stage. 
26 See Eur. Alc. 614-733 (Admetus, Pheres), Med. 446-622 (Medea, Jason). 
27 See Her. 120-283, Hec. 1109-1292, Tro. 860-1059: (Menelaus will change his mind after the end 
of the play), Hel. 865-1090, Pho. 446-635, Or. 470-728, IA 1146-275 (Iphigenia will change her 
mind later). 
 6 
 In Euripides, ‘anger’, ‘shame’, and ‘autonomy’ are three crucial factors in 
blocking the persuasive effects of ‘language’. The point of many agones is not so 
much that they perform persuasion onstage, but that people stress the autonomy of 
individuals, and their power to make decisions based on their view of moral actions 
and of their own character. Note that some speakers in agones later accept the 
advice given to them in the agon. When they do change their mind (for real or with 
the intent to deceive), they stress the fact that their decision has been reached 
‘autonomously’.  
 Anger is a crucial element that often prevents characters from taking considerate 
decisions: orge is opposed to euboulia28. Diodotus states this as a general principle 
in the Mytilene debate in Thucydides (Thuc. 3.42.1):  
 
νοµίζω δὲ δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα εὐβουλίαι εἶναι, τάχος τε καὶ ὀργήν 
I think that two things are the worst enemies of good counsel: haste and anger 
 
The most characteristic example of this interaction of emotion and persuasion occurs 
in the Medea. ‘Anger’ is one of the defining emotions of Medea29. These are the 
very first words of Jason when he meets her for the first time onstage, at the 
beginning of the second episode (Eur. Med. 446-7), just before the agon30: 
 
οὐ νῦν κατεῖδον πρῶτον ἀλλὰ πολλάκις 
τραχεῖαν ὀργὴν ὡς ἀµήχανον κακόν.  
Not now for the first time but often before I have seen what an impossible evil to deal 
with is a fierce temper. 
 
Jason stresses this just before the end of the episode: 
 
λήξασα δ' ὀργῆς κερδανεῖς ἀµείνονα.   615 
Forget your anger and it will be the better for you. 
 
The entire second episode is framed between these references to anger, and in fact 
Medea’s speech in the agon is a ferocious denunciation of Jason’s misdeeds. In the 
fourth episode, Medea claims she has changed her mind completely. ‘Adopting the 
stance of the weak, irrational female’31, she says she has now recognised the wisdom 
of Jason’s advice in the agon. Medea mentions her own process of reflection, but 
claims that Jason’s words were crucial to maker her change her mind (Eur. Med. 
869-74):  
 
Ἰᾶσον, αἰτοῦµαί σε τῶν εἰρηµένων 
συγγνώµον' εἶναι· τὰς δ' ἐµὰς ὀργὰς φέρειν  870 
εἰκός σ', ἐπεὶ νῶιν πόλλ' ὑπείργασται φίλα. 
                                                
28 On deliberation and euboulia in Homer and Sophocles see Schofield 1986, Goldhill 2009, Hall 
2009, and Hall 2012. 
29 See Mastronarde 2002, 17-18 and on Eur. Med. 121, 156, Harris 2001, 169-71, with further 
references. On particles and emotions in general see Drummen 2016 section III.5. 
30 Translations from Medea are taken from Kovacs 1994. 
31 Mastronarde 2002, 312 on 866-975. 
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ἐγὼ δ' ἐµαυτῆι διὰ λόγων ἀφικόµην 
κἀλοιδόρησα· Σχετλία, τί µαίνοµαι 
καὶ δυσµεναίνω τοῖσι βουλεύουσιν εὖ,  
Jason, I beg you to forgive what I said: it is reasonable for you to put up with my anger 
since many acts of love have passed between us in the past. I have talked with myself 
and reproached myself thus: ‘foolish creature, why am I raving and fighting those who 
arrange things for the best?’ 
 
It is all too easy for Jason to be persuaded that he has managed to persuade Medea. 
Medea is in fact denouncing ‘anger’ as the emotion that clouded her reasoning, just 
as Jason predicted. Had she not been angry in the second episode, her attitude would 
have been perceived as feigned; having displayed the emotion Jason expected her to 
feel, she is perceived as ‘sincere’ in her repentance. Her words appear to him 
persuasive and ‘natural’; he thinks he persuaded her (Eur. Med. 885-6, 892-3): 
 
  … ἐγὼ δ' ἄφρων,     885 
ἧι χρῆν µετεῖναι τῶνδε τῶν βουλευµάτων  
... 
παριέµεσθα καί φαµεν κακῶς φρονεῖν   892 
τότ', ἀλλ' ἄµεινον νῦν βεβούλευµαι τάδε.  
It is I who am the fool, since I ought to be sharing in your plans […] I give in: I admit 
that I was foolish then, but now I have taken a better view of the matter. 
 
In no other play does a character admits that the arguments advanced in an agon 
achieved persuasion. Medea mimics the language of autonomous moral agents, like 
Admetus, Heracles and Theseus, who arrive at a decision ‘autonomously’ (even if in 
fact they repeat arguments that others used with them)32. Differently from other 
characters, she explicitly refers to Jason’s arguments and claims that, after her new, 
calmer, ‘autonomous’ reflection, she found them persuasive. This is exceptional. 
She manages to be so convincing to Jason precisely because she rejected his advice 
in the agon: it took her time to restrain her emotion (haste is an enemy of good 
deliberation, as Diodotus states in Thucydides) and when she finally managed to 
restrain herself she accepted his point of view. Jason is enthusiastic (Eur. Med. 908-
13):  
 
αἰνῶ, γύναι, τάδ', οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα µέµφοµαι· 
εἰκὸς γὰρ ὀργὰς θῆλυ ποιεῖσθαι γένος 
γάµους †παρεµπολῶντος† ἀλλοίους πόσει.  910 
ἀλλ' ἐς τὸ λῶιον σὸν µεθέστηκεν κέαρ, 
ἔγνως δὲ τὴν νικῶσαν, ἀλλὰ τῶι χρόνωι, 
βουλήν· γυναικὸς ἔργα ταῦτα σώφρονος. 
I approve this, woman, nor do I blame your earlier resentment. It is natural for a 
woman to get angry when marriage of a different sort presents itself to her husband. 
But your thoughts have changed for the better, and though it took time, you have 
recognised the superior plan. These are the acts of a prudent woman. 
 
                                                
32 See esp. Eur. Alc. 939-61, Suppl. 334-45, HF 1340-52.  
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In assessing the behaviour of Medea, and the effect of his persuasive rhetoric, Jason 
focuses on εἰκός, a crucial concept in historical and rhetorical theory and practice33. 
He poses as a prudent leader who, like Pericles in Thucydides, is able to assess the 
mood and emotions of other individuals, and is not fazed by an occasional outburst 
of anger: in particular, Pericles’ last speech in Thucydides aims at assuaging the 
anger of the Athenian demos34. In Euripides, Jason is won over by his own 
arguments. He persuades himself, and as a consequence of that he is defeated. The 
only instance of ‘persuasive’ rhetoric proves to be a perfect counterexample: only 
fools think their rhetoric will convince other people, and they pay the price for their 
excess of self-confidence.  
 It is not a coincidence that this counterexample features a woman as the person 
who is ‘persuaded’: Medea adopts (or feigns) the kind of self-blaming language that 
is characteristic of female characters in Greek literature. She not only ‘reflects’ by 
herself (ἐµαυτῆι διὰ λόγων ἀφικόµην: 872) but blames herself (κἀλοιδόρησα: 
873) and employs words of self-abuse (σχετλία ... µαίνοµαι: 872; ἀβουλίαν: 882; 
ἄφρων: 885). Medea renounces her previous ‘storm of [...] wearisome prattling’, 
στόµαργον ... γλωσσαλγίαν (Eur. Med. 525), and turns to the language of self-
blame, which Jason finds appropriate. Jason accepts Medea’s generalisation about 
the ethical and intellectual inferiority of women and finds it in keeping with the 
frequent language of self-abuse adopted by women (Eur. Med. 889-91): 
 
ἀλλ' ἐσµὲν οἷόν ἐσµεν, οὐκ ἐρῶ κακόν, 
γυναῖκες· οὔκουν χρῆν σ' ὁµοιοῦσθαι κακοῖς, 890 
οὐδ' ἀντιτείνειν νήπι' ἀντὶ νηπίων.  
Well, we women are, I will not say bad creatures, but we are what we are. So you 
ought not to imitate our nature or return our childishness with childishness. 
 
Modern audiences may perceive these words of Medea as exaggerated and, as 
consequence, as offering the vital clue that reveals her insincerity. In fact it Medea’s 
abuse of women that makes her more, not less believable to the mind of Jason, who, 
like the prototypical misogynist Hippolytus (Eur. Hipp. 615-24), fantasises a world 
without women (Eur. Med. 573-5): 
 
χρῆν γὰρ ἄλλοθέν ποθεν βροτοὺς 
παῖδας τεκνοῦσθαι, θῆλυ δ' οὐκ εἶναι γένος· 
χοὔτως ἂν οὐκ ἦν οὐδὲν ἀνθρώποις κακόν.   575 
Mortals ought to beget children from some other source, and there should be no female 
sex. Then mankind would have no trouble. 
 
Other female characters use similar language to express Medea’s abuse of women at 
889-91 (see Andromache in Eur. Andr. 352-4). To Jason, the fact that Medea 
despises women simply means that she has come to see the truth. Accepting 
                                                
33 See Hoffman 2008, with further references. 
34 Pericles, like Jason, begins with a guess on the emotion of the people he is addressing: «I am not 
surprised that your anger is directed against me: I understand the reason for it» (Thuc. 2.60.1, 
translation Rhodes 1988). 
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persuasion is thus presented as a feminization of the self: Medea (apparently) 
accepts to be lead by her man.  
 Male characters prefer to construe their changes of mind as a quest for their own 
true self, rather than an acceptance of other people’s words. Theseus in the Suppliant 
women provides one of the best examples: in the first agon, he rejects Adrastus’ plea 
and refuses to rescue the bodies of the Argive leaders who died in the war against 
Thebes. Theseus’ decision threatens to prevent one of the crucial mythical episodes 
in the history of Athens, routinely quoted as an example of Athenian justice and 
prowess in speeches for the fallen Athenian soldiers: the fight with Thebes to 
impose the burial of the people who died in the war led by Polyneices35. Euripides 
plays with audience expectations, making them wonder how the play will return on 
course, and allow Theseus and the city of Athens to perform the deeds they were 
famous for. Thesus is then approached by his mother Aethra, who begs him to 
accept the supplication of the mothers of the fallen Argive leaders. He changes his 
mind, and decides to accept the request of the suppliants, but he explicitly comments 
on the fact that he has not been persuaded by the words of his opponent in the agon, 
Adrastus. He is acting instead on the basis of ‘consistency’ with his true nature 
(Suppl. 334-9):   
 
ἐµοὶ λόγοι µέν, µῆτερ, οἱ λελεγµένοι 
ὀρθῶς ἔχουσ' ἐς τόνδε κἀπεφηνάµην   335 
γνώµην ὑφ' οἵων ἐσφάλη βουλευµάτων. 
ὁρῶ δὲ κἀγὼ ταῦθ' ἅπερ µε νουθετεῖς, 
ὡς τοῖς ἐµοῖσιν οὐχὶ πρόσφορον τρόποις 
φεύγειν τὰ δεινά. 
Mother, the words I spoke to this man were the truth: I spoke my mind about the 
counsels that ruined him. Yet I can also see what you say to me, that it is not like me to 
run from danger36. 
 
The element that clinches Theseus’ decision is the ‘true nature’ argument. Theseus 
refuses persuasion, and changes his mind only because the ‘new’ course of action is 
more in accordance with his nature of moral agent. This theory implies that «you 
must consider not only the fact that you are a rational being […] when deciding how 
it is right to act. […] Among other things, you must be true to your own character, 
and people with different characters may be called on to act differently in the same 
circumstances» (Sorabji 2006: 41). This is the ethical theory of Cicero (Off. 1.112) 
and Epictetus (Arr. Epict. diss. 1.2). Cicero and Epictetus appropriately use the 
theatrical terms persona and prosopon. This is because «Personae are constituted 
partly by our roles in life, and many of these roles, like fatherhood, are common to 
many people. But in some cases of special interest, there is a unique persona» 
(Sorabji 2006 158). Cicero quotes the example of Cato’s suicide. It was right for 
him to kill himself, not for every person defeated by Caesar. Cato would stop being 
who he was if he did not kill himself. Similarly, Theseus would stop being Theseus 
                                                
35 See Flower and Marincola 2002, Asheri in Asheri, Vannicelli, Corcella and Fraschetti 2006 on Hdt. 
9.27.1-6 esp. 9.27.3, Aeschylus’ Eleusinians (cf. Plut. Thes. 29.4-5), Wilkins 1993, xi-xix, Allan 
2001, 25, Collard 1975a vol. I, pp. 3-7, Todd 2007, 218-21 on Lys. 2.7-10, with further references. 
36 Translation Kovacs 1998. 
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if he did not fight in favour of Adrastos. The same applies to Heracles in HF 1240-
52: shame (see esp. 1160, 1200)37 gives him «a sense of who one is»  (Williams 
1993: 102). Only by appealing to his sense of identity (1248-52, 1412-17) can 
Theseus induce Heracles to reconsider his decision to kill himself. 
 In the Iphigenia at Aulis, Iphigenia too, in the agon (IA 1146-275), fails to 
persuade her father not to kill her. Like many other characters, including Medea and 
Heracles, she changes her mind later, well after the end of the agon; like Admetus 
(Alc. 940 ‘now I understand’: ἄρτι µανθάνω), Medea, and Heracles, she stresses 
the fact that her change of mind was brought about by autonomous reflection, not 
persuasion (IA 1374): 
 
οἷα δ' εἰσῆλθέν µ' ἄκουσον, µῆτερ, ἐννοουµένην· 
Hear, mother, the thoughts that have come to me as I pondered38. 
 
In fact, she echoes some of Agamemnon’s arguments, but presents them as her own, 
carefully avoiding any reference to her father’s speech or to persuasion. Iphigenia’s 
sense of her own identity is crucial to her decision, even when she echoes the 
patriotic words of her father, who justified the sacrifice claiming that Greece  ‘must 
be free’, not subject to the violence of ‘barbarians’ (IA 1273-5). Agamemnon 
himself presented this argument as an afterthought and addition to the argument that 
the Greek army would force him to sacrifice his daughter anyway, even if he tried to 
oppose them (IA 1255-72). Iphigenia too reformulates that argument, saying that 
Achilles should not die in the vain attempt to prevent her sacrifice (1390-3). The 
point that clinches the discussion is another self-disparaging, anti-feminine remark 
(IA 1394): 
 
εἷς γ' ἀνὴρ κρείσσων γυναικῶν µυρίων ὁρᾶν φάος. 
Better to save the life of a single man than ten thousand women!  
 
a remark that is also often found on the lips of men, often expressed in the context of 
accusation towards women39. 
 In her final appeal she goes well beyond Agamemnon’s comparatively tame 
remarks. Agamemnon insisted that he lacks freedom, and that he is a slave of Greece 
and of the necessity of the sacrifice (IA 1272: τούτου δ' ἥσσονες καθέσταµεν). 
Iphigenia, on the contrary, stresses her freedom (note δίδωµι at 1398), and redefines 
her femininity, claiming that self-sacrifice is a (better) substitute for children, 
marriage, and good name (in decreasing order of importance) (IA 1398-1402): 
 
   δίδωµι σῶµα τοὐµὸν Ἑλλάδι. 
                                                
37 See Cairns 1993, 291-5 for a fine discussion of ‘shame’ in the Heracles. 
38 Translation (here and below) from Kovacs 2002. This paper was submitted before the publication 
of Collard and Morwood 2017; this book now offers an excellent edition and interpretation of the 
play. 
39 See esp. Il. 9.339, Aesch. Ag. 62, 448, and IA 1417-20; for similar statements in reference to other 
women see Eur. HF 1308-9 (with Bond 1981 ad loc.), Aesch. Suppl. 476-7 ‘then comes the bitter 
waste – and it is a bitter waste – of men bloodying the ground for the sake of women’ (trans. Bowen 
2013; see Friis Johansen and Whittle 1980 ad loc.) 
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θύετ', ἐκπορθεῖτε Τροίαν· ταῦτα γὰρ µνηµεῖά µου 
διὰ µακροῦ καὶ παῖδες οὗτοι καὶ γάµοι καὶ δόξ' ἐµή. 
βαρβάρων δ' Ἕλληνας ἄρχειν εἰκός, ἀλλ' οὐ βαρβάρους  1400 
µῆτερ, Ἑλλήνων· τὸ µὲν γὰρ δοῦλον, οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι.  
I shall give myself to Greece. Make sacrifice, all of you, and sack Troy! That shall be 
my long-lived memorial, that for me will be my children, my marriage, my good 
name! Greeks, mother, must rule over barbarians, not barbarians over Greeks: the one 
sort are slaves, but the others are free men! 
 
Her change of mind has sparkled a complex controversy: some interpret take her 
final appeal as sincere, whereas other see her as an inconsistent character, as 
plagiarised by Agamemnon, as deluded, or as acting because of her (undeclared) 
love for Achilles40. Like Jason, and, earlier in the play, Menelaus (501), she appeals 
to what is εἰκός: her self-sacrifice will help restore the consistency in the world, not 
simply the consistency in her own character or in her interpretation of other people’s 
action.  
 In conclusion, the agones in Euripides rarely introduce changes into the plot; 
language fails to achieve persuasion. In most cases, the decisions are taken in 
advance; if the judge is one of the speakers, the chances of persuasions are low. 
Some of the people involved in agones do change their minds; but the change of 
mind takes place later in the play, and is presented as reached autonomously. 
‘Shame’ and ‘reflection’ are part of this process of autonomous deliberation. 
Moreover, ethical choices are presented as dependent on the uniqueness of each 
character, rather than on general rational criteria. The conflict expressed in rhetorical 
contest is thus crucial to the development of character in plots. Medea is the only 
character who explicitly admits that she was persuaded, and she plays on her gender 
identity, and on the expectations of male interlocutors on female submissiveness, 
successfully persuading them of the sincerity of her feigned submission. Iphigenia’s 
change of mind occurs within a frame of partial masculinisation: she presents herself 
as concerned with glory and the outcomes of war, and assumes the self-disparaging 
attitude that mimics the misogyny of male speakers. Her speech is thus considered 
persuasive and is approved by male characters (less so by female characters: IA 
1454-5). Euripides thus gives his female character a language that is 
‘inappropriately’ manly, but unpredictably so: his female characters do not speak 
like men, but mix female and male speech genres and traits. It is this very 
fragmentation that makes Euripides’ characters so puzzling and fascinating41.  
 
                                                
40 See Siegel 1980, Stockert 1992 passim, Rabinowitz 1993, 38-54 Gibert 1995, 222-54, Burgess 
2004, Beltrametti 2008, Mirto 2015, and now Collard and Morwood 2017 passim for a survey of the 
main interpretations and different assessment of Iphigenia’s character and choice.  
41 On the language of female characters in Euripides see Battezzato forthcoming. Thanks are due to 
organisers and participants to the colloquium held in Palermo where this piece of research was 
presented. A version of this paper was presented in Cambridge, thanks to the invitation of R. Hunter, 
whom I also thank for the invitation and his comments. I would also like to thank M. Catrambone for 
comments on a written draft of this paper. I alone am responsible for any infelicities or errors of fact 
or judgment. This piece of research is original and received financial support from the Università del 
Piemonte Orientale. 
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